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Abstract
On the basis of a unique database of policy makers’ comments, we find that central bank 
communication does influence behavior of financial markets. This effect is asymmetric 
and depends on the contents and direction of the statements. Moreover, we investigate 
whether individual characteristics of MPC members may influence their ability to affect 
the asset prices. We find that market participants are most vigilant to the comments made 
by policy makers who are relatively reticent, usually win voting and match their words 
with deeds. Moreover, the impact of statements on financial market behavior depends on 
whether a speaker represents a hawkish, dovish or neutral faction within the committee. 
Finally, we provide evidence that central bank communication affects the predictability of 
monetary policy decisions.
JEL classification: C32; E43; E52; E58; G12
Keywords: Monetary policy; Central bank; Transparency; CommunicationIntroduction
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Introduction
6LQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHVFHQWUDOEDQNLQJSUDFWLFHKDVVKLIWHGIURPVHFUHF\WRZDUGV
PRUHWUDQVSDUHQF\DERXWPRQHWDU\SROLF\VWUDWHJ\DQGREMHFWLYHV1 The survey conducted 
by Fry et al. (2000) indicated that in 1998 three out of four central banks considered 
transparency as a vital or very important component of their monetary policy framework. 
Recent studies confirm that this trend continues. Indeed, as evidenced in Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007), over the 1998–2005 period in 89 out of 100 analyzed central banks 
the value of the transparency index increased and in no country the transparency was 
reduced (!).
One factor behind the movement towards more transparency is related to the 
accountability requirement. In particular, without explaining to the public the rationale of 
their decisions independent central banks would suffer from a ‘democratic deficit’ (see, 
e.g., Blinder et al. 2001).
The case for transparency is also, and even more importantly, based on policy 
effectiveness. It is directly linked with an increased awareness of the critical role of private 
sector expectations in the monetary policy conduct. Indeed, the short-term interest rate, 
which constitutes the main instrument of monetary policy in most industrialized economies, 
matters very little for the future inflation outlook and for prospective economic activity 
6YHQVVRQ&HQWUDOEDQNSRZHUPD\WKXVVHHPWREHOLPLWHG(IILFLHQF\RIPRQHWDU\
policy, however, may greatly be improved through its impact on private sector expectations. 
Expectations about the entire future path of interest rate shape the yield curve and thus 
determine longer-term rates, which, in turn, largely affect private sector consumption and 
investment decisions. In this respect, monetary policy is an art of managing private sector 
expectations.
An attempt to influence private sector expectations simply by revealing more 
information may not suffice, however, for people face both quantitative and complexity 
limits to process information effectively (Kahnemann 2003). In other words, too 
much information may kill information (Fracasso et al. 2003). It is clarity and common 
understanding, and thus better transparency rather than more transparency that conditions 
the central bank’s power to manage private sector expectations. Achieving that, in turn, 
depends on the policy makers’ ability to communicate their intentions in an intelligible 
manner. Therefore, the effectiveness of monetary policy should benefit from transparency 
the most, when it is accompanied by good communication policy (Issing, 2005; Winkler, 
2000). In this sense, good communication is an indispensable element of transparency.
The role of communication has been reinforced by the fact that central bank 
independence has often gone in tandem with delegating the monetary policy decision 
from a single person to a committee of individuals. Indeed, moving to a committee 
decision-making body would be pointless in a central bank that simply takes orders from 
the government. However, in a central bank that conducts monetary policy independently, 
the benefits of the committee-based decision making process, discussed e.g. in Blinder 
(2007), could finally be materialized. Notwithstanding the advantages that this process has 
entailed, explaining the interest rate decision made by a group of individuals may not be 
that straightforward as in the case of a single person.
1 The role of transparency in monetary policy has been examined, inter alia, by Canzoneri (1985), Faust 
DQG6YHQVVRQ(LMIILQJHUHWDO-HQVHQ$FRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRIWKHRUHWLFDOVWXGLHV
on central bank transparency is presented by: Geraats (2002), Hahn (2002), Carpenter (2004), Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007).Introduction
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Depending on the structure of a committee,2 different communication strategies 
should be adopted. It may be particularly challenging in an individualistic committee,
ZKHUHHDFKSROLF\PDNHUYRWHVLQGLYLGXDOO\DQGGHFLVLRQVDUHPDGHE\PDMRULW\YRWH,Q




would result in cacophony rather than clarity (Blinder 2007). The question that then arises 
is whether more “talkative” policy makers help to dispel doubts or rather add to confusion 
as regards prospective interest rate decisions?
The answers to the above, as well as to other queries on the effectiveness of central 
bank communication require empirical testing. The results obtained may play a critical role 
in the assessment of whether the recent movement towards greater transparency and 
central bank communication will prove durable.
In this study, we investigate the effectiveness of the communication of the National 
Bank of Poland (NBP). Motivation for the choice of this central bank is at least twofold. 
First, the NBP has for many years conducted monetary policy under inflation targeting, 
which is a framework that emphasizes the critical role of the communication channel in the 
PRQHWDU\WUDQVPLVVLRQPHFKDQLVP6HFRQGYHU\IHZDWWHPSWVKDYHEHHQPDGHWRDVVHVV
the effectiveness of central bank communication in emerging market economies. Focusing 
on Poland helps to fill this gap.
For the purpose of this paper a unique database of policy makers’ verbal comments 
has been built, which required the examination of nearly 40,000 newswire reports. It is 
analyzed whether central bank “talk” provides relevant information for economic agents, 
and – consequently – whether it influences their behavior. Benefiting from the contribution 
of Bernanke et al. (2004) we have not confined ourselves to a general conclusion whether 
statements of the policy makers do influence the market-based indicators. It is also 
examined whether central bank “talk” affects expectations of future decisions in the 
desired direction and whether and when this impact varies with the horizon of the potential 
interest rate movements. Moreover, the potential asymmetric impact of communication is 
investigated by splitting statements into separate categories depending on the direction of 
the comments made. It allows us to check whether the asymmetric effects of central bank 
communication found for some countries are also present in Poland.
Whereas the above-outlined approach is not entirely new in the empirical literature, 
this study – to our knowledge – pioneers an in-depth empirical research on the effectiveness 
of central bank communication in other areas. First of all, it distinguishes as many as four 
different categories of verbal statements depending on whether their contents have been 
deemed relevant for the monetary policy inclination, the economic outlook, exchange rate 
behavior, or fiscal policy assessment. Moreover, the impact of central bank communiqués 
is analyzed separately. The rationale behind such an approach is that one might expect 
that the impact of central bank “talk” on financial markets should vary with the form and 
contents of its communication.
Next, since the interpretation of policy-makers’ comments is not always 
straightforward, distinct categories of ambiguous vs. clear-cut statements (communiqués) 
KDYHEHHQGLVWLQJXLVKHG6XFKFODVVLILFDWLRQKHOSVWRILQGRXWZKHWKHUPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWV
are sensitive to a particular kind of statements and react to them even if their meaning is 
not unambiguous.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of central bank “talk” is analyzed not only in terms of 
what is communicated, but also whoFRPPXQLFDWHVZLWKWKHSXEOLF6LQFHWKH3ROLVK03&
2 Blinder (2007) distinguishes different categories of committees, including genuinely collegial,
autocratically-collegial, and individualistic committees.Introduction
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is an example of an individualistic committee comprising heterogeneous policy makers, 
it could be expected that communication effectiveness may vary with individual MPC 
members. One way to investigate this issue is based on distinguishing between hawkish, 
neutral and dovish speakers. The other approach separates statements made by MPC 
PHPEHUVZKRZLQPDMRULW\RIYRWLQJIURPWKRVHPDGHE\SROLF\PDNHUVZKRDUHXVXDOO\
outvoted.
Moreover, for each individual decision-maker a consistency ratio is built, which 
serves to answer the question of whether it pays to match words with deeds, or whether 
a consistent MPC member is more influential than a non-consistent one. Yet another 
classification aims at investigating if the impact of an individual MPC member’s “talk” 
varies with the frequency of his or her statements.
Finally, the paper investigates to what extent the predictability of monetary policy 
decisions has been influenced by central bank communication. This relationship is of critical 
importance, for it is through increased predictability that central bank “talk” is argued to 
PDNHPRQHWDU\SROLF\PRUHHIIHFWLYHLQDFKLHYLQJLWVREMHFWLYHV:LQNOHU%OLQGHUHWDO
2001). To this end, we apply the method similar to that of Rozkrut et al. (2007) and Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2005) that allows examining whether frequency and dispersion of central 
bank statements affects the unexpected component of a monetary policy decision.
The results are as follows. First, we find that central bank “talk” influences market 
expectations of future policy decisions and it does so in the desired direction. The strength 
and significance of this effect vary with the horizon of potential interest rate movements 
and largely depend on the adopted form of communication.
6HFRQGWKHDQDO\VLVLQGLFDWHWKDWLIPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWVUHDFWWRDPELJXRXVFHQWUDO
bank signals, it is only in the case of communication conveying information on monetary 
policy inclination, whereas other statements are effective only when made in a clear-cut 
manner.
Third, we provide the empirical evidence that central bank communication influences 
financial asset prices in an asymmetric manner. In particular, market participants react 
more to tightening than easing MPC statements.
Fourth, we find that the impact of policy-makers’ comments on asset prices depends 
on whether they represent a hawkish, dovish or neutral faction within the MPC.
Fifth, the results obtained show that market participants pay much more attention to 
the comments made by policy makers who usually win voting than to the statements made 
by the often outvoted MPC members.
6L[WKWKHVWXG\LQGLFDWHVWKDWGHFLVLRQPDNHUVZKRYRWHLQOLQHZLWKWKHLU
previous statements influence asset prices more than those who do not match their 
words with deeds.
6HYHQWKZHSURYLGHWKHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHPRUHĴWDONDWLYHĵWKH03&VSHDNHUVDUH
the less powerful are their statements.
Finally, we find that not only central bank communication affects financial asset prices, 
but it also influences the predictability of monetary policy decisions. This predictability 




The next two sections provide the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of central bank 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQLQ3RODQG6HFWLRQLQFOXGHVWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLPSDFWRISROLF\
PDNHUVĳVWDWHPHQWVRQILQDQFLDODVVHWSULFHVDQG6HFWLRQļRQWKHSUHGLFWDELOLW\RIFHQWUDO
bank decisions. The final section concludes.Empirical literature on the effectiveness of central bank communication
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1
Empirical literature on the effectiveness 
of central bank communication
There is a vast literature that extols the virtues of a good central bank communication. 
Its seminal role for the effectiveness of monetary policy has been stressed, inter alia, by 
Bernanke (2004), Blinder (1998), Buiter (1999), Issing (2005), King (1997), and Woodford 
(2005).
Contrary to these authors, another strand of literature points to the double-edged 
QDWXUHRISXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQ$QLPSRUWDQWZRUNRI0RUULVDQG6KLQDQG$PDWR
0RUULVDQG6KLQLQGLFDWHGWKDWFHQWUDOEDQNFRPPXQLFDWLRQPD\EHZHOIDUHUHGXFLQJ
The reason is that central bank “talk” is not only a source of information, but also a focal 
point that coordinates expectations of market participants. Central bank communication 
may, therefore, suppress the private information of individual agents and thus crowd 
out an important source of information. In such circumstances the disclosure of public 
information that is imprecise and noisy may coordinate actions away from fundamentals 
and reduce welfare. Welfare-reducing effects of central bank communication are also 
discussed in Gosselin, Lotz and Wyplosz (2006) and Cornand and Heinemann (2006). 
Moreover, different situations when release of information is not desirable are analyzed in 
Mishkin (2004) and Cukierman (2007).
)LQGLQJVRI$PDWR0RUULVDQG6KLQKRZHYHUKDYHEHHQSXWLQWRTXHVWLRQE\
:RRGIRUGDQG6YHQVVRQ,QSDUWLFXODUWKHODWWHULQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHUHVXOWV
of Amato et al. (2003) have been misinterpreted as antitransparency, whereas – he 
DUJXHVļWKH\DUHDFWXDOO\SURWUDQVSDUHQF\6YHQVVRQVWUHVVHVWKDWH[FHSWLQYHU\VSHFLDO
circumstances, which are highly unlikely in the real world, more public information is 
always good. This debate has not yet been resolved, however, as evidenced, inter alia, by 
WKHUHVSRQVHRI0RUULV6KLQDQG7RQJWR6YHQVVRQĳVDUJXPHQWV
The answers to the above, as well as to other queries on the effectiveness of central 
bank communication require empirical testing. However, despite the recent proliferation 
of literature on transparency and communication, including the way these concepts are 
measured and their role in monetary policy effectiveness, the topic is far from being 
exhausted in the field of empirical research.
Moreover, studies that do investigate the reaction of financial markets to central 
EDQNFRPPXQLFDWLRQIRFXVSUHGRPLQDQWO\RQGHYHORSHGHFRQRPLHV.RKQDQG6DFN
(2004) analyze the effectiveness of statements released by the FOMC and congressional 
testimony by Chairman Greenspan. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) compare the effects of 
communication between the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the ECB (henceforth 
G3 central banks*đUND\QDNHWDOLQYHVWLJDWHWKHHIIHFWVRI86PRQHWDU\SROLF\





communication. A recent study by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) makes an interesting 
DWWHPSWWRWHVWHPSLULFDOO\WKH0RUULV6KLQK\SRWKHVHV\HWLWLVGRQHDJDLQIRUWKH)HGHUDO
Reserve only. Moreover, research focusing on explanation of central bank decisions via its Empirical literature on the effectiveness of central bank communication
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1
communication instruments include: Gerlach (2007), Heinemann and Ulrich (2005) and 
Rosa and Verga (2007), all for the ECB.
Contrary to the research done for developed economies, very few attempts have 
been made to assess central bank transparency in emerging markets. Those include the 
VWXGLHVRI0DWRXVHN-DUPXĝHNHWDO&]RJDïDDQG.RWDQG\]LDNHW
DO6WLOOOHVVKDVEHHQGRQHWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHHIIHFWVRIFHQWUDOEDQNFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
in this group of countries. To our knowledge, it is only Gabriel and Pinter (2006) and 
5R]NUXW5\ELñVNL6]WDEDDQG6]ZDMDWKDWKDYHDQDO\]HGLQGHSWKWKHLPSDFWRI
central bank “talk” on asset prices in transition economies. The former has been done 
IRU+XQJDU\IRUWKHSHULRG$XJXVWļ6HSWHPEHUZKHUHDVWKHODWWHUIRUWKH
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (for 2001-2004). This paper aims to fill this gap, as 
well as to contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of central bank communication 
in a number of other aspects.Measuring communication





In order to assess the effects of central bank “talk” individual statements of the policy 
makers (HI) and central bank communiqués (8) are investigated. These have been found 
PRVWO\LQWKHQHZVZLUHVHUYLFHVVXFKDV5HXWHUV1HZV'RZ-RQHV1HZV3$3,6,6HFXULWLHV
as well as in the NBP website. The statements have been split into different categories, 
depending on whether their contents have been deemed relevant for the monetary policy 
inclination (MP), the economic outlook (:8), exchange rate behavior (;M), or fiscal policy 
assessment (;E).3 Central bank “talk” has been dropped when it has concerned other 
topics.
All the reports that include the name of the policy maker, which has been the search 
command employed, have been analyzed, which totaled 36 696. However, while picking 
relevant reports and assigning to them the exact time they were made public, following 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) and Rozkrut et al. (2007) only the first report in the 
newswire service has been chosen, whereas subsequent reports and comments on the 
same statement have been passed over. Using this source of information allows obtaining 
statements, as well as other analyzed events (e.g. monetary policy decisions, release of 
macroeconomic news) with the exact time they are released. Finally, the following values 
has been assigned to the distinguished statements:
HIi
BE={
+1 inclination of tightening monetary policy
-1 inclination of easing monetary policy
HIi
:8={
+1 improved economic outlook
-1 weaker economic outlook
HIi
;M={
+1 indication of undervalued exchange rate
-1 indication of overvalued exchange rate
HIi
;E={
+1 statement criticizing fiscal situation
-1 statement favoring fiscal situation
The same procedure has been applied while assessing the contents of central bank 
communiqués.
It needs to be emphasized that the assessment of communication variables is made in 
relation to the expectations or appraisal that have prevailed so far. For example, a tightening 
statement does not have to correspond with an indication of the interest rate hike. Contrary 
to that, it may even point to the interest rate reduction, but smaller than reflected in market 
expectations, and thus result in the upward movement of the yield curve.
6LQFHWKHDVVHVVPHQWKDVKDGWRLQYROYHVRPHGHJUHHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\DQDWWHPSW
to reduce it has been made by looking at the analysts’ comments and opinions on the 
MPC statements and communiqués. These are found in the newswire services, as well as 
in commercial banks’ dailies. Moreover, in the case of many statements, not least those 
ambiguous, an independent assessment has been made by up to four economists. When 
3 In the case of communiqués, only monetary policy inclination and economic outlook categories have 
been distinguished. It is due to a very small number of communiqués whose contents would be deemed 
relevant in terms of the exchange rate or fiscal policy assessment. Measuring communication
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differences have arisen, the “problematic” statements have been scrutinized once again and 
cross-checked with the assessment made by financial analysts. This procedure sometimes 
resulted in reaching a consensus on the value assigned to a particular statement, but on other 
RFFDVLRQVHQGHGXSLQGURSSLQJLW0RUHRYHUZKHQPDMRULW\RIYLHZVSUHYDLOHGWRZDUGVRQH
direction, yet the contents of the statement could not be deemed unambiguous, a separate 
category of ambiguous (HI
VbW or 8VbW), in contrast to clear-cut (HIXaZVg or 8XaZVg) statements 
or communiqués has been distinguished. Differentiating between these two categories 
may also help to find out whether market participants are sensitive to a particular kind of 
statements and react to them even if their meaning is not unambiguous.
2.2 Asymmetric impact of communication
Another issue of interest is whether the influence of statements on financial markets 
depends on the direction they are made. Therefore, it may be useful to distinguish separate 
categories of tightening (HI
BETi^\]i) and easing (HIBETZVhZ) statements (for HIBE equal +1 and 
-1, respectively), positive (HI
:8Tedh) and negative (HI:8TcZ\) economic outlook statements, 
statements suggesting appreciation (HI
;MTVeeg) and depreciation (HI;MTYZeg) of the exchange 
rate, and, finally, statements critical (HI
;ETWVY) and favorable (HI;ET\ddY) of fiscal policy 
situation.
6XFKDQDSSURDFKPD\EHXVHIXOLQDQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHHIIHFWV
of central bank communication are asymmetric, for example, whether hawkish statements 
are more influential than dovish comments. This asymmetry is also investigated in the case 
of NBP communiqués.
2.3 Hawks and doves
Moreover, one might presume that the impact of a particular statement should depend on 
the individual by whom this statement is made. In other words, an attention should be paid 
not only to what is being communicated, but also to who is the speaker.
Therefore, one approach is to distinguish between hawkish (HI
BET]Vl`), neutral 
(HI
BETcZjigVa) and dovish (HIBETYdkZ) policy-makers. In this study, such classification has been 
made on the basis of the survey results. Moreover, since the perception of a particular 
MPC member may have changed over time (e.g., he or she could now be perceived 
as a neutral and no longer as a hawkish speaker), the evolution of the survey results 
KDGWREHDFFRXQWHGIRU6XFKVXUYH\VXVHGWREHUHJXODUO\SXEOLVKHGE\Reuters News.
However, since they are not available for the whole sample period, for the purpose 
of this study, an additional questionnaire has been prepared and distributed among 
international economists that cover the Polish economy. Moreover, ad-hoc survey results 
SXEOLVKHGE\GLIIHUHQWQHZVSDSHUVKDYHDOVREHHQXVHG6LQFHWKHILQGLQJVRIGLIIHUHQW
sources have not always been unanimous (though it has occurred on very rare occasions), 
different classifications have been applied in order to check for the robustness of this 
study’s conclusions.
2.4 Majority and minority speakers
The availability of individual voting records in the whole sample period enables us to 
distinguish yet additional categories of speakers. First, we may differentiate between these 
03&PHPEHUVZKRZLQPDMRULW\RIYRWLQJDQGWKRVHZKRDUHRIWHQRXWYRWHGLHDUH
usually in minority. For each individual MPC member the:
bV_dg^inTgVi^di2 cjbWZgd[kdi^c\ldcdkZgi]ZaVhi&'bdci]h$cjbWZgd[Xdbb^iiZZYVnh
l^i]^ciZgZhigViZYZX^h^dchkdiZYdcdkZgi]ZaVhi&'bdci]hMeasuring communication
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has been calculated. Here, again, in order to check for the robustness of the results, 
different approaches to measure bV_dg^inTgVi^d have been adopted, including weighted 
average of voting records with the weight declining with the time distance that a particular 
voting took place.
When more than one proposal on the interest rate level was voted on during 
the same meeting and some MPC members did not gain enough support for their first 
choice, but won voting on their second best option, these decision-makers were treated 
as if they won 0.5 of voting. The bV_dg^inTgVi^d ranges between 0 (always in minority) 
and 1DOZD\VLQPDMRULW\RIYRWHUVDQGYDULHVRYHUWLPH0RUHRYHUVLQFHYRWLQJUHFRUGV
are not published immediately after the MPC meeting, bV_dg^inTgVi^d does not vary with 
each voting, but with the release of information about it. Therefore, the one-year period 
over which the ratio is calculated covers these votes and decisions on interest rate that 
the public could learn about over the last 12 months, rather than those actually made 
during the period.
$IWHUFUHDWLQJDWLPHVHULHVZLWKPDMRULW\UDWLRVDVVLJQHGWRHDFK03&PHPEHU
statements on monetary policy inclination are grouped into those made by decision-
PDNHUVZLWKDPDMRULW\UDWLRRIDWPRVWHI
BETb^c) and those with a ratio exceeding that 
value (HI
BETbV_).
2.5 Consistent and inconsistent speakers
The second benefit that we can draw from the release of voting records is the possibility 
to distinguish decision-makers that usually vote in the same way as they previously 
communicated from those whose voting records are not consistent with their prior 
statements. In other words, such classification would allow us to answer the question 
whether, from the perspective of an individual MPC member, it pays to match words 
with deeds. For the purpose of this task, for each decision-maker the Xdch^hiZcXnTgVi^d is 
calculated. The way this measure is constructed is as follows.
First, it is assessed whether a particular decision on interest rates came as a surprise 
to market participants. If the absolute value of the monetary surprise component4 equaled 
0.1 percentage point or more, it has been classified as an either hawkish or dovish surprise, 
depending on the sign of the change in the one-month money market rate. Once more, in 
order to check for the robustness of the results, alternative classifications of the hawkish 
and dovish surprises have been created for the positive and negative values of the monetary 
surprise component, respectively. Those included fixed-level thresholds of 0.05, 0.15 and 
0.2 percentage points as well as time-varying measures of ¼ or ½ of the average absolute 
change in the level of the NBP reference rate over the last three (or five) MPC meetings 
during which the interest rate level was changed (or, alternatively, over the preceding 
12-month period).
In the second step, voting of each MPC member is compared with the outcome of 
the central bank ultimate decision. For example, if the interest rate hike of 50 basis points 
turned out to exceed market expectations, then votes supporting such a decision should 
be classified as hawkish. Or, if the interest rate reduction of 25 basis points was in line with 
the expectations of market participants, then votes favoring a decrease in interest rate by 
50 points would be assessed as dovish.
Next, the way a particular MPC member voted is set against the last statement that 
he or she made in the inter-meeting period preceding that decision. For example, every 
time a tightening statement corresponded with a hawkish vote, the decision-maker was 
rewarded with a “consistent speaker” mark of +1, whereas in the opposite case the MPC 
member was punished with an “inconsistent speaker” grade of -1. A mark was not given 
4 Change in the one-month money market rate. For more details on this measure, see sections 4 and 5.Measuring communication
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when a decision-maker did not make a statement in the inter-meeting period or when an 
assessment was not possible.5
















It is thus a time-varying measure with a maximum value of +1 (for a speaker who 
always matches his/her words with deeds) and the lower limit of -1 (for a decision-maker 
who never votes in line with his/her preceding statements). After a time series with 
consistency ratios for each MPC member has been built, statements on monetary policy 
inclination have been grouped into those made by decision-makers with the consistency 
ratio not exceeding 0 (HI
^cXdch) and those with the ratio above that value (HIXdch).
2.6 “Talkative” and “reticent” MPC members
Yet another classification of communication aims at investigating whether the impact of 
statements depends on how active a particular speaker is. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005; 
2007b) and Rozkrut et al. (2007) provide the evidence that more frequent communication 
may be beneficial in helping markets anticipate future decisions of the central bank.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has so far analyzed whether 
the impact of an individual MPC member’s “talk” varies with the frequency of his or her 
statements. This issue is approached by comparing how active a policy-maker was over the 
last three months with the average number (median) of statements (per head) made in this 
SHULRGE\DOO03&PHPEHUV6WDWHPHQWVRQPRQHWDU\SROLF\LQFOLQDWLRQKDYHVXEVHTXHQWO\
been grouped into those made by decision-makers who have been more “talkative” than 
a “median MPC member” (HI
BETiVa`) and those who have been relatively reticent (HIBETgZi^X).
The above-outlined different categories of statements may be combined in order to 
get still more insight into how central bank communication works. For example, one might 
investigate whether MPC members who match their words with deeds, but usually lose 
YRWLQJDUHPRUHRUOHVVLQIOXHQWLDOWKDQĴPDMRULW\VSHDNHUVĵZKRYRWHLQDZD\WKDWLVQRW
consistent with their preceding statements. In addition, it may be checked if the effects of 
these statements vary with monetary policy inclination (tightening vs. easing), and so on.
7KHDQDO\VLVFRYHUVWKHSHULRGEHWZHHQ-DQXDU\DQG'HFHPEHU
DQGWKLVFKRLFHPD\EHMXVWLILHGRQVHYHUDOJURXQGV)LUVWWKHPRQHWDU\SROLF\KDGWKHQ
already been conducted under inflation targeting, which is a framework that emphasizes 
the critical role of the communication channel in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
6HFRQGDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHVDPSOHSHULRGWKHDQDO\]HGVHJPHQWVRIILQDQFLDOPDUNHWV
in Poland were already liquid enough to draw reliable conclusions on the obtained results. 
Finally, prior to 2001, there is a shortage of data for many variables used in this study.
The period under analysis includes 72 committee days,6 72 communiqués, and 982 
verbal statements.7 The number and structure of observations concerning policy-maker 
VWDWHPHQWVDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQ
5 The latter applies to some of the situations when a decision on interest rates turned out to be in line 
with market expectations. If that decision was voted for by an MPC member whose last statement, classified 
as tightening (easing), was followed by a rise (fall) in the short-end of the yield curve, then it cannot be 
excluded that that statement helped to steer market expectations and thus avoid the surprise caused by 
WKHFHQWUDOEDQNGHFLVLRQ6XFKDVWDWHPHQWVKRXOGWKHQEHGHHPHGFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHVXEVHTXHQWYRWH
of the MPC member. However, since in these circumstances an assessment of such statement is far from 
ambiguous, it was skipped and the mark was not given. 
6 I.e. the days when the MPC holds the meeting during which the decision on interest rates is made. No 
change in the level of central bank interest rate is also classified as a decision.
7 This number relates only to those statements that have been found relevant for this study.6RPHVWDWLVWLFVRQWKH1%3FRPPXQLFDWLRQ




Before moving on to a more technical analysis, we look at central bank communication 
divided into four categories, i.e. statements and quotes related to (1) monetary policy 
inclination, (2) to economic outlook, (3) to the strength or weakness of domestic currency, 
and (4) to the assessment of the fiscal policy (Table 1). In addition, governor’s statements 
have been distinguished, as one might expect that his voice carries more weight than that 
of other MPC members. In order to facilitate the assessment of the NBP communication, 
some figures have also been quoted for the Czech and Hungarian central banks, though for 
the 2001–2004 sample only.
Table 1
Communication on monetary policy inclination, economic outlook, foreign exchange 
(FX) view and fiscal policy assessment
* Data for the CNB and MNB (the Czech and Hungarian central banks, respectively) based on Rozkrut et al. (2007) and 
calculated for 2001–2004 sample.
The table groups central bank comments regarding monetary policy inclination (into tightening/easing), economic outlook 
(positive/negative), exchange rate level (appreciation/depreciation), and fiscal policy assessment (critical/favorable) and 
compares these distributions with the actual outcomes (excluding fiscal policy assessment). For example, the frequency of 
tightening decisions refers to the observations on increase in the official interest rate as a share of all interest rate decisions. 
The frequency of ‘positive economic outlook’ reflects the share of the observations on industrial output that exceeded 
the market expectations (approximated by the median from the Bloomberg survey). The figure on the foreign exchange 
appreciation relates to the percentage of months with zloty strengthening in the period under analysis.
The preliminary assessment of the NBP communication starts with setting the 
ratio of tightening to easing statements (Table 1, rows 1–2, column 3) against the 
ratio of interest rate increases to interest rate reductions (row 3, column 3). This simple 
comparison suggests that in the sample period the MPC communication was biased 
towards tightening statements, which is particularly evident in the case of the NBP 
Governor. The tentative findings hold after quoting similar statistics on the CNB and MNB 
communication (rows 1–3, columns 4–5), though the Hungarian central bank also seems 
to be characterized with a significant “tightening bias”. Among the three central banks 
Monetary policy inclination Economic outlook
7LJKWHQLQÚ Easing Tightening/Easing ratio Positive Negative Positive/Negative ratio
CNB* MNB* CNB* MNB*
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(3) Decisions 4% 38% 0.1 0.3 0.3
(4) Industrial output 53% 47% 1.1  2.2 0.6
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it is the CNB – its governor in particular – that seems to have provided the best guidance 
on interest rate decisions.
The analysis of comments on the economic outlook8 (rows 1–2 and 4, columns 
6–8) indicates that in this area the NBP communication has been well balanced, but the 
Governor’s statements were dominated by overly optimistic economic growth perspectives. 
On the other hand, the CNB comments were relatively conservative.
In the case of communication on exchange rate developments, the NBP comments 
again were well balanced and seem to have corresponded with the actual development 
in the FX market.9 In the presence of the currency appreciation trend, all of the CNB 
statements on the koruna level indicated its overvaluation or suggested that it should 
weaken. Contrary to the CNB stance, the Hungarian central bank tended to indicate that 
the forint should appreciate.
Concerning the NBP communication on fiscal policy,10 it was dominated by very 
critical comments, with 72 statements indicating deterioration in the fiscal policy against 
only 11 pointing to improved situation in the general government sector.
Table 1 provides yet another interesting insight into the NBP communication, namely the 
level of Governor’s activity in public communication. As a Chairman of the 10-member Council, 
the Governor made 14 per cent of all MPC statements on monetary policy inclination, 17 per 
cent on economic outlook, and 9 per cent on the exchange rate behavior. Therefore, he did not 
dominate the NBP communication. The only exception were the Governor’s comments on fiscal 
policy situation, which accounted for 41 per cent of all MPC statements on this topic. Indeed, 
fiscal policy played a very important role in the NBP communication, which diminished only 
after new nine MPC members were elected in the early 2004. The involvement of the Governor 
in this area is reflected in the number of his comments on fiscal policy situation exceeding the 
amount of his statements on the economic outlook and exchange rate behavior.
The tentative finding, based on the statistics presented in Table 1, suggests that 
in the period under analysis the NBP communication was biased towards too hawkish 
statements. An explanation behind such a behavior might be that during the disinflation 
period the MPC might have preferred to err on the tightening side in order to secure that 
the process was not reversed. The Polish MPC might thus have valued deviations below and 
above the target differently, i.e. its loss function was asymmetric. If deviations above the 
target level were considered more costly by the policy-makers, it was probably reflected in 
the way the central bank conveyed its intentions and information to the public.
However, the above analysis based on the average ratio of tightening to easing statements 
is not free of drawbacks. It does not take into account that frequency of statements vary over 
time and, consequently, that the analyzed ratios are also time-varying. Moreover, it interprets 
all, for instance, tightening statements as indicating interest rate increases, whereas in some 
situations they simply point to a more moderate rate cut than expected by the markets. Last 
EXWQRWOHDVWWKH3ROLVK03&LVDQH[DPSOHRIDQLQGLYLGXDOLVWLFFRPPLWWHHVHH6HFWLRQZLWK
WKHPDMRULW\RILWVPHPEHUVGHFLGLQJRQWKHLQWHUHVWUDWHOHYHOEXWWKRVHZKRORVHYRWLQJFDQ
also present their views in public. Therefore, some proportion of statements represent the 
views of minority members and not the central bank decision that is likely to be taken.
One way to cope with these shortcomings is to construct the above-described consistency 
indicator, which aims to measure whether policy makers’ words match their deeds. The findings 
based on the use of this indicator, as well as of other communication measures, are presented 
in sections 4 and 5, where the effectiveness of central bank “talk” is investigated.
8 Economic performance relative to market expectations has been approximated by comparison of 
industrial output releases relative to market consensus forecast (row 4, column 8). 
9 For the purpose of this analysis the percentage of months with currency appreciation is set against the 
percentage of months with exchange rate weakening (row 7, column 3) – see also footnote 11.
10 In the case of communication on fiscal policy, the data is available only for the NBP.The impact of central bank communication on financial asset prices
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The impact of central bank 
communication on financial asset prices
Central bank power to manage private sector expectations depends on the policy makers’ 
ability to communicate their intentions in an intelligible manner. However, if a central bank 
is to steer those expectations as intended, policy makers must first possess the skills to 
guide the markets through effective communication. To assess the effectiveness of central 
bank “talk”, it is investigated whether MPC statements provide relevant information for 
economic agents and – consequently – influence their behavior.
To this end, the reaction of financial variables to monetary policy statements is 
measured. It is examined how yields with different maturities, the exchange rate (MG)11
and the stock market index (WIG) react to central bank “talk” in terms of both their level 
and volatility.12 Lack of intra-day data for Poland in the sample period limits the analysis to 
daily movements of financial variables.
As each communiqué is preceded by a decision on interest rates, which may have 
a significant impact on the financial asset pricing, this effect has to be controlled for.13 It 
is achieved by allowing each financial variable to respond to an unexpected component 
of the monetary policy decision, approximated by the change in the one-month money 
market rate on that day.14 For all other non-committee days the measure of the surprise 
component has been set to zero.
Release of macroeconomic news is another factor that may significantly influence 
the movements of financial variables. The need to control for this effect is particularly 
important when one takes into account the fact that data releases often take place on the 
same day or even in the short-time window surrounding a central bank decision or a policy 
maker statement. In order to cope with this issue, firstly, a number of macroeconomic 
variables that are important to decisions of financial market participants are selected.15
The relevance of these economic data seems to be supported by their inclusion in the 
PRVWSRSXODUDQDO\VWVIRUHFDVWSROOV6HFRQGO\VLPLODUO\WR.RKQDQG6DFNIRUHDFK
macroeconomic news we calculate the surprise component, measured as the difference 
between the expected value less the realized value, the former corresponding to the median 
from the Bloomberg and – where necessary – Reuters and PAP surveys. Finally, we allow 
each financial variable to respond to the surprise component normalized by its standard 
deviation. For all days with no data release that component has been set to zero.
11 8 Q WLO PLG   WKH ] OR W\ H[FKD QJH UD W H PRYHPHQ WV DJDL QVW WKH 8 6  GROODU DQG IURP WKHQ RQZDUGV
DJDLQVWWKHHXURKDYHEHHQWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW7KHUHDVRQLVWKDWLQWKHIRUPHUSHULRGLWZDVWKH86GROODU
and in the latter it was the euro that played the role of the ”reference currency” for the Polish FX market 
participants.
12 One cannot exclude, however, that on some occasions policy-makers’ comments, rather than being 
the source of movements in various asset prices, are in fact induced by the current situation in financial 
markets. In particular, such an endogeneity problem may arise during financial market turmoil that creates 
high demand for the central bank “talk”, which may (but does not have to) simply reflect the market 
developments. 
13 No interest rate change on the committee day has also been classified as a decision.
14 For the yields whose quotations are set before an announcement, a respective figure from the following 
day is taken into account.
15 For the Polish economy it gives a total of 603 macro releases over the analyzed period, which include 
the data on: CPI, net-inflation, food prices, PPI, current account, GDP, industrial output, retail sales, wages, 
money supply, and unemployment. The impact of central bank communication on financial asset prices
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Moreover, while explaining the behavior of domestic interest rates, the euro area 
interest rate of the corresponding maturity has been included into regressions. The reason 
is that market participants focus on spreads between converging countries’ yield curves and 
the euro yield curve, and thus the latter’s movements are reflected in the local interest rate 
changes. In the equation with a change in the exchange rate level as a dependent variable, 
a change in the interest rate disparity (the difference of three-month money market rates 
LQ3RODQGDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRUWKHHXURDUHDļVHHIRRWQRWHKDVEHHQDGGHGDV
a regressor. Finally, in the case of the WIG change as a dependent variable, a percentage 
FKDQJHLQWKH06&,LQGH[16 has been included into regression. These additional explanatory 
variables help to reduce the omitted variable bias and to capture the influence of external 
developments on the prices of domestic financial assets.
As already mentioned, this paper aims to measure the influence of communication 
on both the level and volatility of financial asset prices. In order to test both and account 
for the interaction between the two the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model, proposed 
by Nelson (1991) has been used. This approach has already been applied in several research 
studies on the reaction of financial variables to monetary policy communication (Connolly 
DQG.RKOHU-DQVHQDQG'H+DDQ(KUPDQQDQG)UDW]VFKHUD,QWKLV
paper, the conditional mean equation for the asset price return and the equation for the 
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g i   daily change in the domestic interest rate (in percentage points); change in 
the zloty exchange rate (XR) or stock market index – WIG (in per cent),
B H 8 i   the unexpected component of policy decisions, approximated by the change 
in the one-month money market rate on the committee day, zero otherwise,
M i   the vector of controls that includes: day-of-the-week effects, surprise 
component of macroeconomic news and change in the euro interest rate of 
the corresponding maturity (for the domestic interest rate as a dependent 
variable) or change in the interest rate disparity (for XR) or change in the 
06&,LQGH[IRU:,*
 9 i–1 the information set at time i–1,
] i the conditional variance,
K d i ^ c \ i   dummy variable equal 1 on the day of publication of MPC voting records 
and 0 otherwise,
G D > i   dummy variable equal 1 on the day of publication of the Inflation Report 
and 0 otherwise,
N i vector that includes absolute values of variables included in the vector Mi.
As the left-hand side of Eq. (3) is the ln of the conditional variance, there is no need 
to impose non-negativity restrictions on the conditional variances. The model has been 
estimated with the method of maximum likelihood and the heteroskedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix has been applied (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992).
16 $QLQGH[FUHDWHGE\0RUJDQ6WDQOH\&DSLWDO,QWHUQDWLRQDO06&,WKDWLVGHVLJQHGWRPHDVXUHHTXLW\
market performance in global emerging markets.
9The impact of central bank communication on financial asset prices
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For each dependent variable a separate regression is run on the variables chosen. 
6XEVHTXHQWO\XQOHVVLWOHDGVWRWKHLQFUHDVHLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFULWHULDQRWOHDVWWKH
6FKZDU]FULWHULRQHDFKUHJUHVVLRQLVJUDGXDOO\UHGXFHGE\HOLPLQDWLQJWKRVHYDULDEOHVRQH
by one) that have turned out not to be significant in either mean or variance equation. As 
a result, a different specification of the model for every dependent variable is arrived at.
In the first step, statements and communiqués that enter the estimated equations 
are divided into four and two categories, respectively, related to (1) monetary policy 
inclination, (2) economic outlook, (3) the strength or weakness of domestic currency, and 
(4) the assessment of the fiscal policy.
Results reported in Table 2 suggest that NBP communication does influence the asset 
prices and it always works in the “desired” direction. It means that MPC statements that, 
for example, reveal information on likely monetary policy tightening lead to an increase 
in market interest rates and a decrease in the WIG index. Moreover, central bank “talk” 
conveying a positive economic outlook leads to a rise in the yield curve, as improved 
economic prospects should result in an upward revision of the expected interest rate path.
Table 2
Market reaction to central bank communication
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
The LR (likelihood ratio) test is a test whether model with communication variables has a higher explanatory power than the 
model without these variables.
However, the effectiveness of NBP communication seems to be limited almost 
exclusively to the statements and communiqués conveying information about monetary 
policy inclination, with the former affecting the yield curve at maturities up to two years.17
The likely explanation why MPC communication is most influential and highly statistically 
significant in this case is that it is the future interest rate path, not least in the short-term, 
that belongs to the area where information asymmetry between the central bank and the 
public is the largest. Therefore, the public signal issued by a central bank should in these 
circumstances be particularly influential.
The impact of the NBP statements and communiqués on the yield curve ranges in 
absolute value from 0.3 to 0.7 and from 1.9 to 2.6 basis points, respectively. In addition, 
they influence the stock market index – WIG (from 0.08 per cent to 0.32 per cent). However, 
no communication instruments affect the exchange rate behavior.
Table 3 compares the effectiveness of monetary policy inclination and economic 
outlook statements in the group of four countries. It shows that statements on monetary 
policy inclination influence financial asset prices both in Poland and developed economies, 
17 In addition, statements on the economic outlook also seem to impact on financial asset prices. However, 
they influence only the short-end of the yield curve, i.e. three-month money market rate.
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though the yield curve reacts much stronger to central bank communication in the latter.18
At the same time, however, NBP statements are much more influential in affecting stock 
market quotations. Interestingly, there is no central bank whose statements on monetary 
policy inclination would affect the exchange rate behavior.
Table 3
Market reaction to central bank communication in Poland, the United Stated, the 
United Kingdom and the euro area
**, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant. Data for FED, BoE and ECB based on: Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2005).
Figures reported in Table 3 also indicate that NBP statements on economic outlook 
exert much less influence on financial asset prices compared to the effectiveness of 
comments made by policy-makers in developed economies.
As already mentioned, using EGARCH model allows us to measure the influence of central 
bank communication not only on the level, but also on volatility of financial asset prices.
Table 4 reports interesting results that the communication variables that have been 
found to be highly statistically significant in the mean equation, hardly increase volatility of 
the asset prices. By contrast, comments on the fiscal policy situation, while ineffective in 
the mean equation, are highly statistically significant in the variance equation and increase 
volatility of financial markets. This finding may suggest that the MPC communication on 
the fiscal policy situation was counterproductive in the sense that it did not provide clear 
signals as to the future interest rate path and only added to market uncertainty, as reflected 
in the increased volatility of financial asset prices.
Table 4
Market reaction to central bank communication – volatility equation
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
18 This may be due to more frequent NBP communication translating into lower impact of individual 
statements, which is the issue that is analyzed in subsection 4.6.
3M 6M 12M Yield 2Y Yield 5Y XR Equity
STMP
NBP 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** (–) (–) -0.077**
FED 0.010*** (–) 0.009** 0.010* 0.011* (–) -0.003***
BoE 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.009** (–) (–) (–) -0.003**
ECB 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** (–) -0.004***
STEC
NBP 0.007*** (–) (–) (–) (–) (–) (–)
FED 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.022*** -0.002*** 0.003***
BoE (–) -0.006* (–) (–) (–) 0.002** 0.004***
ECB 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** (–) (–) (–) 0.002*
3M 6M 12M Yield 2Y Yield 5Y XR Equity
STMP
NBP 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** (–) (–) -0.077**
FED 0.010*** (–) 0.009** 0.010* 0.011* (–) -0.003***
BoE 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.009** (–) (–) (–) -0.003**
ECB 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** (–) -0.004***
STEC
NBP 0.007*** (–) (–) (–) (–) (–) (–)
FED 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.022*** -0.002*** 0.003***
BoE (–) -0.006* (–) (–) (–) 0.002** 0.004***
ECB 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** (–) (–) (–) 0.002*
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4.1 Ambiguous vs. clear-cut statements
In subsection 2.1 it has been mentioned that due to difficulties that arise during the 
assessment of some communication variables, separate categories of ambiguous (HI
VbW or 
8
VbW) and clear-cut (HIXaZVg or 8XaZVg) statements or communiqués have been distinguished. 
After including them in the regression and re-running the whole estimation procedure, the 
new estimation results have been obtained, which are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Market reaction to central bank ambiguous and clear-cut communication.
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
The findings are generally in line with the intuition in that clear-cut communication 
exerts much more influence on market expectations than vague statements.19 This 
is particularly evident in the case of the NBP communiqués that – if conveying an 
unambiguous message – affect the yield curve at maturities up to five years and the 
stock market index. In addition, statements on the exchange rate level and fiscal policy 
assessment may sometimes influence financial asset prices, but only when made in 
a clear-cut manner.
Interestingly, the results indicate that when ambiguous signals influence the markets, 
it is only in the case of statements or communiqués on monetary policy inclination, whereas 
other statements are effective only when made in a clear-cut manner. This seems to confirm 
the previously expressed view that market participants are most vigilant to central bank 
communication when it is related to the future interest rate path and, in this case only, 
react even to vague signals.
19 The only exceptions are the impact of ambiguous monetary policy inclination statement on the WIG 
index and the effect of ambiguous communiqués related to monetary policy inclination on the exchange 
rate level.
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4.2 Asymmetric effects of central bank communication
In this subsection an attempt is made to answer the question whether the effects of central 
bank communication are asymmetric. For that purpose communication variables have been 
split into different categories, as described in subsection 2.2, depending on the direction 
the statements have been made.
The results presented in Table 6 are striking. First, they show that tightening 
statements are more influential than easing ones. This is in line with findings of 
Andersson et al. (2002) who show that speeches given by the Riksbank Executive Board 
members with an unexpected message of tighter monetary policy have had a much 
stronger influence on the yield curve than speeches with an expansionary monetary 
policy message. Gabriel and Pinter (2006) also provide the evidence that the Hungarian 
central bank is more successful in signaling monetary policy tightening than easing. The 
likely explanation that they come up with for this finding is that market participants 
assume that the central bank has an asymmetric reaction function and reacts quicker if 
the monetary conditions have to be tightened and slower if it considers the monetary 
conditions to be too strict.
Table 6
Asymmetric effects of central bank communication on financial markets behavior
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
The LR (likelihood ratio) test is a test whether model with communication variables has a higher explanatory power than the 
model without these variables.
Applying the above explanation to the Polish case would suggest that the NBP 
has an asymmetric inflation target, i.e. that it has more tolerance for inflation deviations 
EHORZWKDQDERYHWKHWDUJHWOHYHO+RZHYHUWKH)LJXUHLOOXVWUDWHVWKDWPDMRULW\RI03&
decisions have in fact undershot market expectations and that easing surprises have been 
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on average twice as large as tightening ones.20 More precisely, in the period under analysis 
the monetary surprise component was 37 times negative, with an average value of -15.4 
basis points, and 30 times positive, with an average value of 8.2 basis points.
 Although we cannot exclude that the NBP reacts asymmetrically to inflation 
developments, the above findings indicate that market participants tend to overestimate 
that effect. One source of this market inefficiency might be too hawkish a communication 
of the Polish central bank that misguides the markets; the other explanation could be too 
strong a market reaction to tightening statements made by the MPC members.
Figure 1
The unexpected component of policy decisions, approximated by the change in the 
one-month money market rate on the committee day
Interestingly, Table 6 shows that financial asset prices react much stronger not only 
to tightening statements but also to tightening surprises (BH8Ti^\]i) on the committee 
days than to decisions that turned out to be unexpectedly dovish (BH8TZVhZ). This might 
suggest that easing surprises are largely the result of the shift in the expected timing of 
policy actions, as opposed to shifts in the near-term path of policy expectations, and as 
such have much less consequence for the expected course of monetary policy beyond 
a few-month horizon. For example, an interest rate reduction may have come as a surprise 
to market participants only because they were unsure as to whether that decision would be 
made at the current or the next MPC meeting. Although surprising due to its timing, such 
a decision would not affect the general level of policy expectations reflected in the longer-
term interest rates.
In order to investigate that issue, we apply the Gürkaynak et al. (2006) methodology. 
It distinguishes two sources of the surprise component of the monetary policy decision: one 
that represents the change in the timing of policy actions (the “timing” factor) and the other 
that influences the general level of policy expectations (the “level” factor). Therefore:
BH8i=i^b^c\i+aZkZai
Whereas the “timing” factor would not affect the level of the interest rate expected 
after the subsequent MPC meeting, the “level” factor would be reflected in the near-term 
path of the interest rate. Due to the lack of futures contracts for the NBP rates in the sample 
period, we approximate the shift in the expected level of interest rates going forward by 
the change in the FRA contracts.21 Therefore:
$;G6i, cm`=A aZkZai
stands for a reaction of the expected (`–c)-month interest rate after c months 
20 Large unexpected components of policy decisions at the beginning of the sample period are the result of 
the significant changes in the level of the NBP reference rate at that time. It is not, however, the consequence 
of poor liquidity of the money market and, therefore, does not affect the obtained estimation results, whose 
robustness has been additionally checked by running regressions for the sample period starting in 2002. 
21 For the same reason, the monetary surprise component is approximated by the change in the one-month 
money market rate and not the appropriately scaled change in the current-month NBP rate futures contract 
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The size of the current monetary policy shock may be influenced by both the “timing” 
and “level” factors. By contrast, the change in the ;G6 contracts is not affected by the 
timing component. Assuming that the two factors are orthogonal, we follow Gürkaynak 
et al. (2006) and solve the above decomposition based on the variance-covariance 
matrix from the observed policy shocks, which gives us: A=                        , and thus: 
aZkZai=                and i^b^c\i=BH8i–               .
Figure 2 illustrates a time series of that decomposition and shows that a large share 
of the surprise component has often been due to the timing rather than the scale of the 
decision on the interest rate level.23 The decomposition also indicates that in case of 
easing surprises, the absolute size of the “timing” factor on average exceeded that of the 
“level” factor, whereas the opposite happened in the case of tightening surprises. It is in 
line with the findings that the yield curve reacts more to tightening than easing monetary 
policy surprises.
Moreover, since on some occasions the “timing” and “level” factors go in the opposite 
GLUHFWLRQZKLFKLVSDUWLFXODUO\HYLGHQWLQ1RYHPEHURU-XQHWKLVLQGLFDWHVWKDW
there must be other than “level” factors influencing market expectations. These would 
most likely include policy-makers’ statements and central bank press releases following the 
decision on interest rates. Therefore, the assumption made in the above decomposition 
that it is only the “level” factor that influences the change in the ;G6 contracts on the 
committee day seems to be to strong.
Figure 2
Monetary surprise component decomposed into the “level” and “timing” factors
Figure 2a – decomposition based on ;G61x4  contracts 
Figure 2b – decomposition based on ;G63x6  contracts
Another explanation behind the asymmetric communication effect may be related 
to the term-structure of banks’ assets and liabilities which – in the case of the surprising 
interest rate increase – would typically lead to their balance-sheet deterioration. Therefore, 
following a hawkish statement, market operators demand a premium and sell their assets 
to guard against capital losses in connection with a previously not envisaged upward 
movement of the yield curve. The reason why dealers are not equally, or symmetrically,
22 Due to low liquidity of FRA contracts at the beginning of the period under analysis, the decomposition 
has been done for the data from March 2002 onwards.
23 The estimated values of A=1.22 for FRA1x4 and A=1.31 for FRA3x6 contracts are close to the result 
obtained by Gürkaynak et al. (2006) of A=1.11. They indicate that since A is close to 1, it corresponds very 
closely to the “rule of thumb” definition of level and timing components of monetary policy announcements 


























































































































































Xdk(BH8, $;G6) $;G6i, cm`
A
$;G6i, cm`
AThe impact of central bank communication on financial asset prices
WORKING PAPER No. 47 25
4
willing to capture new profit opportunities by buying new assets after policy makers’ 
easing comments is that losses loom larger than gains – a key idea of Kahnemann and 
Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory.
Yet another explanation behind the stronger impact of tightening statements than 
easing signals might be that central bank communication increases the uncertainty, and 
thus a risk premium, which – by raising the yield curve – reinforces the effect of hawkish 
statements and softens the impact of dovish comments. However, the results reported in 
Table 4 do not support this hypothesis, because monetary policy inclination statements do 
not seem to lead to increased market uncertainty.
The asymmetric impact of central bank communication is not limited to monetary 
policy inclination statements only. In the case of the comments on the economic outlook, 
they affect financial asset prices only when conveying the unfavorable view and exert no 
impact at all when they are optimistic.
6WDWHPHQWVZLWKDQHJDWLYHHFRQRPLFRXWORRNLQGLFDWHWKDWHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQV
may alter (or have already changed) in a way that would result in a decline of the yield 
curve. This, in turn, create conditions favorable to the rise in T-bills or bond prices, which 
has actually been reflected in the market behavior, as evidenced in Table 6. The question 
then arises why market participants do not react in a similar manner to positive economic 
outlook statements.
The likely explanation is related to the fact that in the period under analysis 
market interest rates in Poland were much more often in a downward rather than in 
DQXSZDUGWUHQG7KHUHIRUHDQDWWHPSWWREHQHILWIURPWKHMXVWKHDUGSROLF\PDNHUĳV
comment on the favorable economic outlook, which could signal monetary policy 
tightening, would on many occasions require speculating against the trend, which is 
a rare phenomenon.24 This, however, may seem to be in contrast with the previous 
finding on the relatively strong reaction of market participants to monetary policy 
tightening statements. The explanation could lie in the already-discussed information 
asymmetry between the central bank and the public that is the largest in the area of 
the future interest rate path. Therefore, market participants are particularly vigilant to 
comments conveying information on monetary policy inclination and follow policy-
makers’ tightening signals in order to guard against potential capital losses, even if it 
requires running against the trend.
The results reported in Table 6 indicate that apart from asymmetric effects of 
statements about monetary policy inclination and economic outlook, still more significant 
differences arise between tightening and easing communiqués. The latter influence the 
whole yield curve and the exchange rate level, whereas the former only the WIG index.
4.3 Hawks and doves
In the next step it is investigated whether the impact of communication depends not 
only on what is being communicated, but also on who is the speaker. For this purpose, 
hawkish (HI
BET]Vl`), neutral (HIBETcZjigVa) and dovish (HIBETYdkZ) MPC members have been 
distinguished in a way described in subsection 2.3.
The results presented in Table 7 are at first glance puzzling. Contrary to the intuition, 
both hawks’ easing and doves’ tightening statements have hardly any effect on financial 
asset prices. On balance, however, these findings may not be that surprising.
24 One reason why speculation against the trend is risky is that trend reversal is hardly predictable (De 
*UDXZH6RURVThe impact of central bank communication on financial asset prices
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Table 7
Market reaction to statements made by hawkish, neutral and dovish policy makers
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.





already gone public with a tightening statement ahead of the dovish MPC member. In these 
circumstances, a hawkish comment given by a “dove” would hardly influence the expected 
future interest rate path. One should expect that such a comment should be very powerful 
only when market participants are uncertain as to the forthcoming central bank decisions, 
LHZKHQDPDMRULW\IDYRULQJDSDUWLFXODUGHFLVLRQLVQRW\HWNQRZQWRWKHSXEOLF,IWKHODWWHU
situation accounts for a relatively small proportion of doves’ hawkish statements, then results 
reported in Table 7 should not come as a surprise to anyone. The same logic applies to the 
explanation why hawks’ dovish comments exert so little influence on financial markets.
In addition, Table 7 confirms the previous findings that tightening statements 
influence financial asset prices more than easing comments made by MPC members and 
that exchange rate behavior is immune to policy makers’ “talk”.
4.4 Majority and minority speakers
The availability of individual voting records in the whole sample period enables us to 
GLVWLQJXLVKWKH03&PHPEHUVZKRZLQPDMRULW\RIYRWLQJIURPWKRVHZKRXVXDOO\GRQRW
get enough support for their proposal (the construction of the respective communication 
variables has been discussed in subsection 2.4). The results reported in Table 8 show that 
PDUNHWVSD\PXFKPRUHDWWHQWLRQWRZKDWĴPDMRULW\ĵVSHDNHUVVD\HI
BETbV_) than to 
statements made by the often outvoted MPC members (HI
BETb^c).
Table 8
Market reaction to statements made by “majority” and “minority” MPC members
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
WIB0R3M WIBOR6M WIBOR12M Yield 2Y Yield 5Y XR WIG
STMP_dove_tight 0.009**
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Moreover, we investigate whether the previously-outlined asymmetric communication 
HIIHFWVDUHDOVRSUHVHQWLQWKHFDVHRIĵPDMRULW\ĵDQGĴPLQRULW\ĵVSHDNHUV7DEOHFRQILUPV
WKDWLWLVPRVWO\WLJKWHQLQJVWDWHPHQWVPDGHE\PDMRULW\VSHDNHUVWKDWLQIOXHQFHILQDQFLDO
market behavior. Both tables once again indicate that policy makers’ comments do not 
affect the exchange rate level.
Table 9
Asymmetric impact of “majority” and “minority” MPC members on financial 
markets behavior
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
4.5 Consistent vs. inconsistent speakers
The second benefit that we can draw from the release of voting records is the possibility 
to answer the question of whether it pays to match one’s words with deeds. For the 
purpose of this task, for each decision-maker the Xdch^hiZcXnTgVi^d is calculated, as outlined 
in subsection 2.5. The estimation results, reported in Table 10, suggest that market 
participants do distinguish MPC members whose voting behavior is consistent with their 
previous statements from those policy-makers who usually do not match their words with 
deeds. In particular, it is tightening statements of consistent MPC members that influence 
financial asset prices the most, which provides yet another evidence supporting the 
asymmetry hypothesis.
Table 10
Market reaction to consistent and inconsistent central bank communication
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
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Table 10 also combines communication variables based on the Xdch^hiZcXnTgVi^d
FULWHULRQZLWKPDMRULW\PLQRULW\FODVVLILFDWLRQ7KHUHVXOWVDUHLQOLQHZLWKSUHYLRXVILQGLQJV
and indicate that consistent speakers who usually win voting exert the most powerful 
impact on the behavior of market participants. These MPC members who rarely match 
their words with deeds may influence financial asset prices, though to a lesser degree, 
RQO\ZKHQWKH\EHORQJWRĴPDMRULW\ĵVSHDNHUV6LPLODUO\SROLF\PDNHUVZKRLQPRVWFDVHV
lose voting may affect financial markets only when their actions are usually consistent with 
their decisions on interest rates. Consequently, market participants do not pay attention to 
statements made by inconsistent minority MPC members.
4.6 “Talkative” and “reticent” MPC members
,Q6HFWLRQLWKDVEHHQSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKHLQIOXHQFHRIVWDWHPHQWVPDGHE\1%3SROLF\
makers on financial asset prices is on average weaker than that of central bankers in most 
developed economies. One explanation might be that Polish MPC members are much 
more active in giving public comments on their monetary policy inclination, as evidenced 
LQ6HFWLRQ7DEOH7KHLQWXLWLRQLVWKDWWKHPRUHRIWHQRQHVSHDNVWKHOHVVDWWHQWLRQ
market participants pay to what he or she says.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005; 2007b) and Rozkrut et al. (2007) provide the evidence 
that more frequent communication may be beneficial in helping markets anticipate future 
decisions of the central bank. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has so 
far analyzed whether the impact of an individual MPC member’s “talk” varies with the 
frequency of his or her statements.
In order to deal with this issue, statements on monetary policy inclination have 
been grouped into those made by relatively “talkative” (HI
BETiVa`) and “reticent” (HIBETgZi^X)
decision-makers, as described in subsection 2.6. The results reported in Table 11 suggest 
that the more active the MPC speakers are, the less powerful are their statements.25 These 
findings may thus at least partly explain the difference between the impact of the NBP and 
G3 central bank communication on financial asset prices.
Table 11
Market reaction to ”talkative” and “reticent” policy makers’ statements
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
(–) means that a variable has not been statistically significant and, on the basis of information criteria, excluding it from the 
regression has proved to be desirable.
Empirical evidence provided in this section shows that central bank communication 
does matter and influence asset prices in the desired direction indicated by policy makers’ 
statements. The most powerful are statements conveying information on monetary 
policy inclination, followed by comments on the economic outlook. Contrary to that, 
communication on the exchange rate and fiscal situation turn out to be inefficient, with the 
latter only increasing the volatility of financial markets.
Moreover, we find that if market participants react to ambiguous central bank signals, 
it is only in the case of communication conveying information on monetary policy inclination, 
whereas other statements are effective only when made in a clear-cut manner. Furthermore, 
central bank communication influences financial asset prices in an asymmetric manner. In 
25 The only puzzling finding relates to the impact of a “talkative” member statement on the two-year 
interest rate. 
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particular, market participants react more to tightening than easing MPC statements and 
negative economic outlook comments are more influential than positive ones.
Moreover, this study contributes to the literature by investigating the impact 
of various individual characteristics of policy-makers on their ability to affect financial 
markets. We find that market participants pay much more attention to the comments 
made by policy makers who usually win voting than to the statements made by the often 
outvoted MPC members. Furthermore, policy-makers who are relatively “reticent” and 
match their words with deeds influence asset prices more than MPC members who are 
“talkative” and inconsistent, respectively. Additionally, we find that the impact of a policy-
maker’s comments on financial market behavior depends on whether he or she represents 
a hawkish, dovish or neutral faction within the MPC.
We have thus shown that central bank communication is a monetary policy 
instrument that can effectively influence the expectations of market participants and – 
consequently – financial asset prices. Therefore, one might expect that communication 
also helps to improve predictability of central bank decisions. This issue is examined in the 
section that follows.Central bank communication and predictability of monetary policy decisions
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Central bank communication and predictability 
of monetary policy decisions
Provided that monetary policy is communicated in a transparent manner and that there is 
no asymmetric information between the public and policy makers, central bank decisions 
should not come as a surprise to the market participants. Consequently, the monetary 
surprise component, approximated by changes in the one-month money market rate on 
the meeting day,26 should be small.
Based on this criterion, the results reported by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) 
indicate that decisions made by the ECB, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank of England 
have been relatively predictable. For these central banks the absolute surprise component 
_06&_RQDYHUDJHDPRXQWHGWRDQGEDVLVSRLQWVUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHILJXUH
obtained for the Czech Republic (5.9 basis points) might indicate that the CNB has almost 
caught up with the world leading central banks in terms of monetary policy predictability 
(Table 12, row 1). On the other hand, the results for Poland and Hungary would suggest 
that in these countries central bank decisions often surprise the markets. For the NBP the 
absolute unexpected component of the monetary policy decision over the 2001–2006 
period averaged 11.3, whereas for Hungary (for 2001–2004) the respective figure amounted 
to 20.8 basis points.
Table 12
Basic statistics on monetary surprise component
* Data for the CNB and MNB based on Rozkrut et al. (2007) and calculated for 2001–2004 sample.
06&dec – monetary surprise component after the central bank meeting with a change in interest rates.
06&nondec – monetary surprise component after the central bank meeting with no change in interest rates.
Dec/committee days – % of committee days with a change in interest rates.
Nondec/committee days – % of committee days with no change in interest rates.
IR1M – one-month money market rate.
However, as emphasized in Rozkrut et al. (2007), and evidenced in Table 12, 
differences in the surprise component of the analyzed central banks’ decisions can also be 
explained by other factors than communication.
26 However, when one-month WIBOR rate quotation was set before the central bank decision was made 
public, the following day figure for the change in the money market rate was taken into account. 
Mean NBP CNB* MNB*
(1) |MSC| 0.113 0.059 0.208
(2) |MSCdec| 0.181 0.18 0.52
(3) |MSCnondec| 0.065 0.015 0.074
(4) |$IR1M| 0.046 0.007 0.058
(5) |MSC/$IR1M| 2.48 8.11 3.58
(6) |MSCdec /$IRlM| 3.97 24.83 8.93
(7) |MSCnondec /$IRlM| 1.42 2.07 1.26
(8) |MSC|/IR1M 0.014 0.018 0.023
(9) |MSCdec|/IRlM 0.023 0.055 0.053
(10) |MSCnondec|/IRlM 0.008 0.005 0.011
(11) Dec/committee days 42% 27% 28%
(12) Nondec/committee days 58% 73% 72%
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One common finding for the analyzed central banks is that decisions on the 
change in interest rates produce, on average, more surprise to the market (|BH8YZX| – rows: 
2, 6, 9) than decisions on no change in the level of monetary instruments (|BH8cdcYZX| – 
rows: 3, 7, 10).27 This difference in the surprise component is much larger for the CNB 
and MNB than for the NBP. At the same time, the proportion of decision days in the total 
meeting periods for the Czech and Hungarian central banks is much lower than in the case 
of the NBP (rows 11–12).
The initially obtained picture of central bank predictability is also influenced by the 
varying degree of market interest rate volatility6LQFHDEVROXWHFKDQJHVLQRQHPRQWK
interest rates in Poland and Hungary are on average much higher than those in the Czech 
Republic (row 4), accounting for this factor in calculating the monetary surprise component 
brings about completely different results in terms of central bank predictability (rows 5–7). 
Finally, taking into account differences in the level of interest rates in the analyzed markets 
is another approach that reorders the initially obtained classification (rows 8–10).
It should thus be remembered that there are factors not related to central bank 
“talk” that explain the differences in the monetary surprise components in various 
countries. However, since the focus of this study is on the effectiveness of central bank 
communication, the key question is to what extent the statements of policy makers impact 
on the predictability of central bank decisions?
To this end, we investigate whether the frequency of statements and unanimity 
among policy makers matter for the effectiveness of central bank “talk”. Following Rozkrut 
et al. (2007) the absolute monetary surprise component on the committee days is regressed 












BE) – number of statements in the inter-meeting period, where:
HJBHI
i
BE – the number of statements on day i
c – the number of days that have gone by since the previous 
committee day
XdchZchjhTgVi^di=                         – the net-balance of monetary policy inclination state-
ments in relation to the total number of statements in 
the inter-meeting period
bVX_, i – the _i] macroeconomic data surprise
The absolute value of the consensus ratio increases with policy-makers’ comments 
approaching unanimity. It takes the maximum value of +1 when all statements in the inter-
meeting period indicate the same monetary-policy inclination.
In addition, one might expect that news on macroeconomic data might also influence 
the predictability of policy decisions, as well as central bank communication. In order to 
deal with an omitted variable bias macroeconomic surprises have been included among 
the explanatory variables in Eq. (4). At the same time, contrary to Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2005), we do not build an index of macro-surprises, for the news releases for different 
data should be of different importance to market participants and central bank decisions.
6LQFHWKHDEVROXWHPRQHWDU\VXUSULVHFRPSRQHQWKDVWREHDQRQQHJDWLYH
value, it requires the estimation of the Tobit model. The results reported in Table 13 
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leads to increased predictability of central bank decisions. Moreover, the monetary surprise 
component decreases with the policy makers’ statements approaching unanimity, or with 
the rise in the absolute value of the consensus ratio.
Table 13
The impact of central bank communication on the monetary policy predictability
In columns (1) and (3) explanatory variables as in Eq. (4). In columns (2) and (4) explanatory variables as in Eq. (5).
P-values are shown in italics below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.
The regression is also run for the absolute surprise component of the monetary policy 
GHFLVLRQDGMXVWHGIRUWKHDYHUDJHYRODWLOLW\RIRQHPRQWKLQWHUHVWUDWHRYHUWKHODVWWHQGD\V
SUHFHGLQJWKHPHHWLQJGD\6LQFHRQVRPHRFFDVLRQVWKDWYRODWLOLW\ZDVFORVHWR]HURSXWWLQJ
it in the numerator would largely increase the value of the dependent variable. Therefore, 
WKHDGMXVWHGDEVROXWHBH8 has been calculated as: |BH8
VY_|=max(0;|BH8|–$L>7DG1B), 
where $L>7DG1B stands for the average absolute change in the one-month money market 
rate over the last ten days preceding the committee day.
The advantage of this approach is that it accounts for a change in money market rate 
on the committee day, being the result of interest rate volatility that simply reflects higher 
interest rate level or the period of increased market uncertainty caused by factors other than 
PRQHWDU\SROLF\VWDWHPHQWV$GRSWLQJVXFKDPHDVXUHVHHPVWREHSDUWLFXODUO\MXVWLILHGLQ
light of the fact that the large part of the sample period covers the NBP disinflation policy 
accompanied by the gradual interest rate reduction from double digit levels. The lack of 
scaling factor could therefore disturb the results.
The results of the regression run for the |BH8
VY_| (Table 13, column 3) confirm the 
previous findings that more frequent communication leads to increased predictability of 
central bank decisions and that the monetary surprise component decreases with the policy 
makers’ statements approaching unanimity. One difference, however, is that the statistical 
significance of the B1 and B2 coefficients somewhat weakens.
Furthermore, the regression is run again with a consensus ratio replaced with an 
alternative measure of the dispersion ratioXVHGLQ-DQVHQDQGGH+DDQDQG(KUPDQQ
and Fratzscher (2005), which is reflected in the following equation:






Y^heZgh^dcTgVi^di=                                    , where:
C=hidX`TgVi^di
9=1 if C is an odd number
9=0 if C is an even number
The value of this measure ranges between 0 (for unanimous communication) and +1
(for totally dispersed statements).
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On the one hand, properties of the XdchZchjhgVi^d seem to be superior to those 
of the Y^heZgh^dcgVi^d. For example, the latter measure does not differentiate between 
a situation when one tightening and one easing statements are made from a situation 
when policy makers make two tightening (easing) and one easing (tightening) comments in 
the inter-meeting period. In either case the Y^heZgh^dcgVi^d takes the value +1.
On the other hand, however, there are at least two advantages of using the Y^heZgh^dc
gVi^d. One is that it allows us to check for the robustness of the initially obtained results; 
the other is that this ratio was used in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) to explain central 
bank decisions predictability. Therefore, applying it in this study enables us to compare the 
findings obtained for the NBP with those for other central banks.
The results shown in Table 13 (columns 2 and 4) do not change the initial conclusions 
and confirm that the predictability of monetary policy decisions increases with more 
frequent communication and with statements approaching unanimity.
In addition, the figures reported in Table 14 compares the results obtained for the 
NBP with those for the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and the ECB. They show that an 
increase in the frequency of NBP communication improves predictability of monetary policy 
decisions in a similar way as the statements made by the Bank of England and, to a lesser 
degree, the Federal Reserve policy makers. Contrary to that, a rise in the dispersion of 
statements made by the Polish MPC members increases the monetary surprise component 
by far more than in the case of the G3 central banks. Moreover, the average value of the 
dispersion ratio of the NBP communication exceeds significantly the figures reported for 
other countries, which might suggest that deviations from consensus-based communication 
accounts for a large share of the monetary surprise component in Poland.
Table 14
Central bank communication and monetary policy predictability in Poland, the 
United Stated, the United Kingdom and the euro area
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.
Data for the Fed, BoE and ECB based on Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) and calculated for 1999–May 2004 period.
However, relatively low average values of dispersion ratio in the G3 central banks 
may be simply due to their much less frequent statements compared with the number of 
comments made by the Polish MPC members. This is particularly evident in the case of the 
Bank of England, where the average value of the stock ratio equals 1, and thus it is very likely 
that on many occasions there was only one statement made in the period between the BoE 
consecutive committee days. In such circumstances, dispersion ratio always equals 0, which 
significantly affects the average value of this measure over the whole sample period. The 
frequency of the ECB and the Federal Reserve communication is on average also much 
lower than that of the NBP.
While analyzing the results reported in Table 13, one may also note that predictability 
of central bank decisions may be lower when interest rates are changed, as evidenced 
in this section. Therefore it cannot be excluded that such circumstances could influence 
communication in the period preceding the committee day. To test whether the 
Impact on |MSC|
NBP FED BoE ECB
stock_ratio -0.016*** -0.010* -0.017*** (–)
dispersion_ratio 0.172** 0.041* 0.106*** 0.029*
Average values
NBP FED BoE ECB
av. stock_ratio 9.1 2.5 1.0 1.9
av. dispersion_ratio 0.810 0.278 0.074 0.145
av. |MSC| 0.113 0.034 0.048 0.030
Impact on |MSC|
NBP FED BoE ECB
stock_ratio -0.016*** -0.010* -0.017*** (–)
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communication variables in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) are endogenously determined with the 
absolute monetary surprise component, the Hausman test is applied. If the endogeneity 
were present, a communication variable, say, the XdchZchjhgVi^d, would be instrumented 
through various factors that might influence the degree of consensus between policy 
makers, but at the same time would be orthogonal to this ratio as well as to the forthcoming 
monetary policy decision. This procedure, however, has proved unnecessary in light of the 
endogeneity test results.
To sum up, irrespective of the modifications to the method originally applied, the 
results reported in Table 13 all indicate that the surprise component of the NBP decision 
decreases with the rise in the frequency of policy makers’ statements. This seems to reflect an 
inherent feature of the sound communication policy, namely that providing the public with 
an increased stock of useful information should enhance monetary policy predictability.28
Another finding is that the predictability of central bank decisions increases with policy 
makers’ comments approaching unanimity. This, however, does not have to imply that 
some MPC members should abstain from going public with their opinions simply because 
WKH\GLIIHUIURPYLHZVVKDUHGE\WKHPDMRULW\RISROLF\PDNHUV
In the genuinely collegial committees, which reach their decisions through a consensus 
and intend to build an aura of full agreement, presenting dissenting opinion would most 
likely be damaging to the effectiveness of central bank policy (Blinder, 2007). Contrary 
to that, in individualistic committees like the Polish MPC, where each policy maker votes 
LQGLYLGXDOO\DQGFHQWUDOEDQNGHFLVLRQVDUHWDNHQE\PDMRULW\SURYLGLQJWKHSXEOLFZLWK
different views and opinions may in fact increase transparency of monetary policy. The 
reason is that this may help the markets to learn about the group dynamics, that is what 
PDMRULW\LVWRSUHYDLORYHUWKHQH[WPHHWLQJVDQGWKXVZKLFKGHFLVLRQVDUHWREHPDGH
Therefore, going public with distinct groups of opinions, though at the cost of 
the communication consensus, may sometimes be more informative than unanimous 
statements made by a limited number of MPC members who represent only one side of the 
FRLQDQGWKXVEOXUWKHDFWXDOPDMRULW\G\QDPLFV&OHDUO\LIdifferent policy makers speak 
with one voice, predictability of the central bank decision should be even higher. This, 
however, may not necessarily be the case when communication consensus is achieved at 
the cost of reduced MPC representativeness.
Notwithstanding the benefits stemming from “minority” comments, one should 
remember that the heterogeneous communication under individualistic committees is 
VXEMHFWWRWKHULVNRIVSHDNLQJZLWKWRRPDQ\YRLFHVZKLFKZRXOGUHVXOWLQFDFRSKRQ\
rather than clarity (Blinder, 2007). Confusing the markets and the public is likely especially 
when it is difficult to identify a particular policy maker with either a dovish or hawkish 
faction. Clearly, a tightening statement of the hawkish central banker has different meaning 
than that of the dovish policy maker. In this context, the minutes and voting records may 
constitute vital communication instruments. Therefore, publication of voting records by 
names may have greatly contributed to the ability of market participants to group the 
Polish MPC members into hawkish, neutral, and dovish policy makers, and thus to the more 
effective central bank communication.29
28 The usefulness of an additional information released is emphasized in order to contrast with a situation 
of the simple increase in the stock of information, which does not necessarily enhance the public’s 
understanding of monetary policy (see, e.g., Winkler 2000). 
29 Indeed, as pointed out in Rozkrut et al. (2007), the survey that they conducted among international 
investment banks proved that respondents had little difficulty to distinguish hawks, doves, or neutral policy 
makers in Poland and the Czech Republic, whose central banks published voting records and minutes, 
respectively. However, surveyed economists reported a lot of problems to produce such a classification for 
the Hungarian MPC members, for whom neither minutes nor voting records were available in the period 
under analysis. In May 2007, the NBP started to publish minutes. The analysis in this study, however, covers 
the 2001–2006 period, and thus does not include the events of the minutes release. Conclusion
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Conclusion
The paper presents an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of central bank communication. 
It examines the impact of policy-makers’ statements on financial asset prices as well as on 
the predictability of monetary policy decisions in Poland.
A simple frequency analysis points to a high inflation bias in the NBP communication. 
Moreover, it indicates that comments made by MPC members are highly critical of fiscal 
situation, with the Governor being particularly active in this area.
Applying the EGARCH (1,1) framework, we show that the central bank “talk” does 
influence the behavior of financial markets. The strength and significance of this effect differ 
among countries, vary with the horizon of the potential interest rate movements and largely 
depend on the adopted form of communication. The most powerful are statements conveying 
information on monetary policy inclination, followed by comments on the economic outlook. 
Contrary to that, communication on the exchange rate and fiscal situation turn out to be 
inefficient, with the latter only increasing the volatility of financial markets.
Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that if market participants react to ambiguous 
central bank signals, it is only in the case of communication conveying information on monetary 
policy inclination, whereas other statements are effective only when made in a clear-cut manner. 
The likely explanation behind this finding is that it is the future interest rate path, not least in the 
short-term, that belongs to the area where information asymmetry between the central bank and 
the public is the largest. Therefore, market participants should be most vigilant to central bank 
communication when it is related to the future interest rate path and react even to vague signals.
Furthermore, the obtained results indicate that central bank communication influences 
financial asset prices in an asymmetric manner. In particular, market participants react more 
to tightening than easing MPC statements and negative economic outlook comments are 
more influential than positive ones.
Moreover, this study contributes to the literature by investigating whether various 
individual characteristics of policy-makers may influence their ability to affect financial 
market behavior. In particular, we find that market participants pay much more attention 
to the comments made by policy makers who usually win voting than to the statements 
made by the often outvoted MPC members. Furthermore, policy-makers who are relatively 
“reticent” and match their words with deeds influence asset prices more than MPC members 
who are “talkative” and inconsistent, respectively. Additionally, we find that the impact of 
a policy-maker’s comments on financial market behavior depends on whether he or she 
represents a hawkish, dovish or neutral faction within the MPC.
Finally, we provide empirical evidence that not only central bank communication affects 
financial asset prices, but it also influences the predictability of monetary policy decisions. One 
finding is that this predictability increases with the frequency of policy makers’ statements. This 
seems to reflect an inherent feature of the sound communication policy, namely that providing the 
public with an increased stock of useful information should enhance monetary policy predictability. 
Another result is that the monetary surprise component decreases with MPC members’ comments 
approaching unanimity. This, however, does not have to imply that some policy-makers should 
DEVWDLQIURPJRLQJSXEOLFZLWKWKHLURSLQLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\GLIIHUIURPYLHZVVKDUHGE\PDMRULW\
of the speakers. The reason is that in an individualistic committee, like the Polish MPC, providing 
the public with different views may help the market to learn about the group dynamics, that is 
ZKDWPDMRULW\LVWRSUHYDLORYHUWKHQH[WPHHWLQJVDQGWKXVZKLFKGHFLVLRQVDUHWREHPDGH
Communicating diversity of opinions may thus not necessarily run counter to transparency.Appendix: Examples of the reports from newswire services and their classification
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Appendix:
Examples of the reports from 
newswire services and their classification
Polish Ctrl Bker: Nov Curr Acct Good, Future Less Bright
'RZ-RQHV,QWHUQDWLRQDO1HZV-DQXDU\
:$56$:ļ'RZ-RQHVļ1RYHPEHUĳVGUDPDWLFQDUURZLQJLQWKH3ROLVKFXUUHQWDFFRXQW
deficit shouldn’t blind markets to uncertainty about whether improvements in the payments 
balance can be sustained, or to increasing downside risk to the resurgent zloty, central bank 
Monetary Policy Council (RPP) member Boguslaw Grabowski said Tuesday.
“Despite the good (November) results, the chances for further current account improvement 
LQDUHOHVVWKDQFOHDUĵ*UDERZVNLWROG'RZ-RQHV1HZVZLUHVLQDWHOHSKRQH
interview.
He said slowing growth in Western Europe, the stronger zloty, and an expected uptick in 
domestic demand early this year could diminish Poland’s export performance and boost 
imports.
In addition, Grabowski warned that foreign investors’ aggressive buying of Polish debt 
VHFXULWLHVKDGSXVKHGWKH3ROLVKFXUUHQF\WRXQMXVWLILDEO\KLJKOHYHOVLQUHFHQWGD\V
Ĵ0\IHHOLQJLVWKDWWKH]ORW\H[FKDQJHUDWHKDVVLJQLILFDQWO\H[FHHGHGOHYHOVMXVWLILHGE\
the economic fundamentals. Investors should keep in mind the possibility of a market 
overshoot and remember to hedge currency risk,” he said.
Evaluation: HI
;M=-1=HI;MTYZeg
Polish Q3 growth may be sustainable-MPC member.
Reuters News, 10:05 GMT, 22 August 2003
:$56$:$XJ5HXWHUVļ3RODQGĳV0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&RXQFLOPHPEHU*U]HJRU]
:RMWRZLF]VDLGRQ)ULGD\UHFHQWXSEHDWPDFURHFRQRPLFGDWDVKRZHGWKDWWKHFRXQWU\ĳV
economic recovery may be breaking through to sustainable high growth.
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Rising Polish debt burden a warning sign-Balcerowicz
Reuters News, 11:32 GMT, 22 November 2005
POZNAN, Poland, Nov 22 (Reuters) – Poland’s public debt expanding faster than its economy 
as a whole is a cause for concern and underlines the need for public finance reform, central 
bank governor Leszek Balcerowicz said on Tuesday.
Evaluation: HI
;E=+1=HI;ETWVYReferences
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